Telling the
Truth in the Media: Mathematically Approved
by
Mahmoud Eid, Ph.D.
October 30, 2006
As
U.S. threats against Iraq mounted in 2003, the majority of
media decision-makers docilely accepted the Bush administration’s
claims that linked Iraq to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs). Their reports lacked sufficient investigation and
verification. There were rare examples of truthful and responsible
journalism, however. Oliver Moore of The Globe and Mail, on
December 6th, 2002, reported on the Iraqi insistence, through
the announcements of the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations
Mohammed al-Douri, that everything related to the weapons
of mass destruction had been destroyed. Moore explained that
the Iraqi government was “tired of repeating ‘again
and again’ that it is not breaking any U.N. resolutions”.
Though Moore’s truthful coverage was not appreciated
by audiences or governments at that time, I think The Globe
and Mail was very proud of their responsible coverage and
increasing credibility when the truth was revealed later on.
By and large, the media strive to tell the
truth, but what if the ‘truth’ as they know it
consists of distorted facts? The unavoidable end result is
that they repeat lies. Further, what about the subjectivity
of truths arising from their societal context? As with ethical
practices, what might be considered ethical practices from
one perspective can be considered quite the opposite from
another. It would seem, therefore, that there must be a way
to solve these dilemmas and make media conduct more responsible,
no matter what side of the fence reporters are on.
A reasonable solution to the ethical dilemmas
media personnel face can be found using mathematics. In game
theory (a branch of pure mathematics), there is one type of
a game called the Truth Game. The Truth Game focuses on the
ethical principle of telling the truth, but it can be broadened
to encompass the ethical principles that guide any response
to a dilemma. The Truth Game, which has been explained mathematically
in my dissertation (2004), highlights the fact that telling
the truth is a rational conduct that, in general, will lead
to the best outcome for the media in relating to their audiences.
Investigating the ethical and unethical
paths that journalistic coverage takes, one finds a motivation
for journalists to report ethically and honestly. Journalists,
editors, managers, and owners are likely to take actions that
will (provably) benefit the medium and contribute to the common
good of society. My dissertation demonstrated that telling
the truth is fundamental in achieving goodness and managing
a conflict peacefully (or winning a game). Therefore, motivation
towards ethical conduct, where otherwise the tendency may
be to opt for another path, would stem from a desire to achieve
beneficial consequences. Further, this contributed to clarifying
the debate surrounding the ambiguity of “ethical and
unethical, but from whose perspective”, as journalists
recognize that in telling the truth, whose veracity has been
checked and verified - regardless of what it is, or who is
favored by its content - will benefit them and ultimately
result in favorable consequences. In essence, rational thinking,
through use of game theory, helps us to understand and explore
the advantages of ethical obligations in journalism. Rationality
obligates media workers to adhere to ethical codes as a key
condition for benefiting all parties involved.
When modeling the verification problem between
superpowers in his Superpower games: Applying game theory
to superpower conflict (1985), Steven Brams introduced a simple
two-person, non-constant-sum (non-zero-sum) game of imperfect
information played between a signaler (S) and a detector (D)—The
Truth Game. I argue that if the mass media take the signaler
position and the audiences take the detector position in the
truth game, as illustrated below, it is rational choice that
they will tell the truth in order to achieve their safer outcome
(the next-worst) and avoid the possibility of getting the
worst outcome, while they also participate in allowing their
audiences to get their best outcome.
In the truth game between the mass media
and their audiences, the media face the challenge of telling
the truth. Media executives must decide whether to tell the
truth when choosing content, and after they have made their
choice, their audiences must then decide whether to believe
the content. The Truth Game uses numbers to rank the outcomes
of decisions made by the two players (the media and the audience)
that satisfy specified goals (truth-telling and believability).
Counterintuitively, verification and falsification exist on
diagonals, both involving true and false statements. That
means that verification ranges from strong to weak, strong
being a believed truth and weak being a disbelieved fallacy.
Conversely, the falsification diagonal crosses from believed
fallacy to a disbelieved truth. In other words, falsification
is range of wrongness and verification is a range of correctness.
The chart below assigns numerical values to each option, indicating
that strong verification (2,4) is numerically the highest
and best outcome, while weak verification (1,3) is the worst.
That means that the worst possible scenario for journalists
is to have an audience that knows it lies. Journalists have
seen this in action as citizen journalism has skyrocketed
in stature.
It is worth noting that as a game of hiding
and discovering the truth, with a secondary emphasis on the
mass media’s desire to be believed and the audiences’
desire that the mass media be truthful, the truth game enables
one not only to distinguish verification (main-diagonal outcomes)
from falsification (off-diagonal outcomes), but also it suggests
a strong and weak distinction in each of these main categories.
Thus, verification is considered stronger when one believes
the truth than when one disbelieves a lie (or untruth), because
the truth is still unclear in the latter case. Similarly,
falsification seems stronger when a lie (or untruth) is believed
than when the truth is disbelieved, because disbelief in the
truth indicates that one has missed the truth but not necessarily
that one has been hoodwinked into believing a falsehood.
Given the fact that this game is not one
of total conflict, i.e. what one player wins does not necessary
mean that the other loses, both players do better at (2,4)
than at (1,3). That is, it is better for everyone when the
news is truthful and the audiences believe it than any alternative.
In other words, truth to be believed is better than lies (or
untruths) to be disbelieved because the former is strong verification
while the latter is weak verification. In addition, the fact
that (2,4) is better for both players than (1,3), and there
is not another outcome better for at least one player and
not worse for the other than (2,4), means that this is the
best outcome that the mass media should work for, given that
they start playing first.
Because there is no stability in this game,
the mass media can do immediately better by departing in the
directions shown by the vertical arrows, from (2,4) to (4,1)
and from (1,3) to (3,2). Also, audiences can do immediately
better by departing in the directions shown by the horizontal
arrows, from (4,1) to (1,3) and from (3,2) to (2,4). However,
if audiences could predict the mass media’s strategy
choice with certainty and if the mass media knew this, the
game would reach an equilibrium if it were played sequentially.
The mass media would choose (T) and audiences would respond
with (B); but each would do worse by departing from these
strategies.
In other words, there is a risk for the
mass media of not telling the truth, and the worst outcome
stems from audience disbelief in the face of media untruths.
In contrast, if the mass media tell the truth, the audiences
will be most benefited (seek their best outcome) by believing
them. This provides the media decision-makers with internal
motivation to tell the truth, thereby following one of the
major journalistic ethical principles, that is based on their
recognition that rational thinking will lead to achieving
their desired goals and help them to practice their responsible
role in society.
It can even be argued that the media can
play an influential role in government policymaking by being
truthful. That is, if rationality leads the media to be truthful
and abide by ethical principles, they will not rely blindly
on announcements by governments or military authorities. Rather,
they will access various sources of information ensuring that
the veracity of this information has been checked and verified
before passing it on to the public. If this adherence to the
truth is followed, then audiences will trust that what the
news media say is true. But, and here is the catch, if they
find that the news media say “the authorities are hiding
facts” or that there is no access for the media to the
information, then the audiences will think that the government
is doing something wrong, since if they weren’t they
would not be afraid of the media’s scrutiny. Thus, denying
the media access or telling them lies will lead to negative
attitudes towards the authorities. That is, the credibility
of the media that has been acquired by playing the Truth Game
rationally and telling the truth to audiences gives them power
over authorities, but their choice of not telling the truth,
which is irrational according to the Truth Game, will make
them lose credibility not only with their audiences but also
in their relations with the authorities.
Dr. MAHMOUD EID is an Assistant Professor at the Department
of Communication at the University of Ottawa. He previously
taught in the University of Regina’s School of Journalism,
and in Carleton University’s School of Journalism and
Communication. His professional expertise lies in quantitative
and qualitative research regarding the effects of mass media
and social development. His teaching experience, research interests,
and publications concentrate on media ethics, international
communication, terrorism, crisis management and conflict resolution.
The title of his Ph.D. dissertation is: ‘Interweavement
- Building a crisis decision-making model for rational responsibility
in the media: International communication, political crisis
management, and the use of mathematics.’